The High Court of Australia has unanimously today upheld the
Commonwealth’s challenge to the validity of the ACT’s same-sex marriage laws.
The suggestion made in this blog
yesterday that the Court would only make orders with reasons to follow at a
later date was too pessimistic an assessment of the Court’s capacity to provide
a reasoned judgment.
In those reasons for judgment, the
Court agreed with the consensus position submitted by the Commonwealth and the
ACT that the reference to “marriage” in the Constitution includes same-sex
marriage, thus confirming that the Commonwealth could, if it chose to do so, legislate with respect to same-sex
marriage.
However, ultimately the Court held
that the ACT’s Marriage
Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013 could not operate concurrently with the
Commonwealth Marriage Act 1961. The ACT law was therefore inoperative. Their reasons for so holding are commendably clear
and concise:
It is necessary to bear steadily in mind that
the federal Parliament has power under s 51(xxi) to make a national law with
respect to same sex marriage. (The Parliament’s power under s 122 of the Constitution
to make laws for the government of any Territory need not be considered.) The
federal Parliament has not made a law permitting same sex marriage. But
the absence of a provision permitting same sex marriage does not mean
that the Territory legislature may make such a provision. It does not mean that
a Territory law permitting same sex marriage can operate concurrently with the
federal law. The question of concurrent operation depends upon the proper
construction of the relevant laws. In particular, there cannot be concurrent
operation of the federal and Territory laws if, on its true construction, the Marriage
Act is to be read as providing that the only form of marriage permitted
shall be a marriage formed or recognised in accordance with that Act.
The Marriage Act regulates the creation
and recognition of the legal status of marriage throughout Australia. The Act's
definition of marriage sets the bounds of that legal status within the
topic of juristic classification with which the Act deals. Read as a whole, the
Marriage Act, at least in the form in which it now stands, makes the
provisions which it does about marriage as a comprehensive and exhaustive
statement of the law with respect to the creation and recognition of the legal
status of marriage. Why otherwise was the Marriage Act amended, as it
was in 2004, by introducing a definition of marriage in the form which now
appears, except for the purpose of demonstrating that the federal law on
marriage was to be complete and exhaustive?
The 2004 amendments to the Marriage Act made
plain (if it was not already plain) that the federal marriage law is a
comprehensive and exhaustive statement of the law of marriage. Those amendments
applied the newly introduced definition of marriage to the provisions governing
solemnisation of marriage and gave effect to that definition in the provisions
governing the recognition of marriages solemnised outside Australia. Section
88EA of the Marriage Act (inserted by the 2004 amendments) provides
expressly that a union solemnised in a foreign country between persons of the
same sex must not be recognised as a marriage in Australia.
These particular provisions of the Marriage
Act, read in the context of the whole Act, necessarily contain the implicit
negative proposition that the kind of marriage provided for by the Act is the only
kind of marriage that may be formed or recognised in Australia. It follows that
the provisions of the ACT Act which provide for marriage under that Act cannot
operate concurrently with the Marriage Act and accordingly are
inoperative. Giving effect to those provisions of the ACT Act would alter,
impair or detract from the Marriage Act. Within the Commonwealth, the Marriage
Act determines the capacity of a person to enter the union that creates the
status of marriage with its attendant rights and obligations of mutual support
and advancement. Under the Marriage Act, a person has no legal capacity
to attain that status, with the rights and obligations attendant on it, by
entry into a union with a person of the same sex.
The full text of the judgment is available here.
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