On Wednesday, 14 November 2012 the High Court of Australia
will deliver three judgments.
The first is in the related cases
of Mansfield v The Queen and Kizon v The Queen. These appeals address the issue of whether or not, in a prosecution for
insider trading, it is necessary for the Crown to establish that the “inside
information” possessed by the appellants is “truthful information” or “a
factual reality”.
The second is in Cooper v The Queen, a case which considers whether or not the defence counsel’s failure
to lead evidence of certain mental health service records which indicated the
deceased suffered from a psychosis that could be exacerbated by drugs and
alcohol, and the failure to cross-examine the deceased’s grandmother concerning
the deceased’s mental health, gave rise to a miscarriage of justice.
The third is in Mills v Commissioner of Taxation, which considers whether the Commissioner was entitled to
disallow certain imputation credits where the purpose of a scheme involving the
issue of unsecured subordinated notes was to enable subscribers to obtain
imputation credits, and the imputation credits were not simply a natural
incident of the capital raising being undertaken.
On Thursday, 15 November 2012 the High Court will deliver judgment in Stanford v Stanford. A somewhat tragic case, in issue is whether
(and if so in what circumstances) the Family Court has jurisdiction to make an
order for property settlement pursuant to section 79 of the Family Law Act
1975 where a marriage is still intact but where a physical separation has
been forced upon the parties by reason of one of the parties’ health. The
proceedings were initiated by the wife’s daughters who asked that the former
matrimonial home be sold so that the proceeds of sale could be spent on care
for their mother. The appeal to the High Court raises numerous related issues,
but central to the case is the constitutional question of the scope of the term
“matrimonial cause” in placitum 51(xxii) of the Constitution.
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