The ABC commented this morning on AM that “A court case in New South Wales five years ago
found that the Church could not be held legally liable for abuse cases because
the Church doesn’t exist as a legal entity and it’s also not liable for its
priests nor their actions.”
The case being referred to is Trustees
of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney v Ellis [2007]
NSWCA 117. That case involved a lawsuit
by Ellis in relation to abuse he allegedly experienced at the hands of one Reverend
Aidan Duggan between 1974 and 1979. At
that time Ellis was an altar boy, and Duggan was the assistant priest in the
Bass Hill Parish, and a member of the Order of St Benedict. Ellis commenced proceedings against Cardinal
Pell as the current occupier of the position of Archbishop of Sydney, the
Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney, and Duggan
himself. Duggan died in 2004 and Ellis
did not pursue the claim against his Estate (this may have been from a
realization that the estate had no value, or from a realization that as he was
dead there was no prospect of getting an extension of the limitation period, or
both).
There are some obvious difficulties. Assuming it could be established,
as was alleged, that “because of the special responsibilities conferred on him
by the Church and the precepts of Canon Law, the [Archbishop] was in a fiduciary
relationship with the Plaintiff and was liable to ensure the protection of the
Plaintiff from abuse” it was Cardinal Freeman, and not Cardinal Pell, who
personally would have had any such responsibility at the relevant time, and not
Cardinal Pell.
Instead, he was sued as the “successor in title” to Cardinal Freeman and
as “representative” of the Archdiocese.
That there could be “no more suitable a representative” is a nice
rhetorical flourish, but is not legally particularly relevant. The Cardinal would need to be a representative
of some legal entity, and this is where the case as pleaded stumbled. It was held (as was blindingly obvious) that
the Catholic Archdiocese of Sydney was an unincorporated association and as
such could not be sued in its name. To
that extent the Catholic Archdiocese was no different from any other
unincorporated association. There was
simply no basis for holding Cardinal Pell liable, whether personally or in some
“representative” capacity for the conduct of Duggan. This is not some special immunity conferred
on the Catholic Church: it is simply an application of orthodox legal
principle.
Then we come to the issue of the
Trustees. They were not sued on the
basis that they owned the land upon which the abuse occurred. Instead, what was claimed was that the
Trustees “constituted the
entity which the
Roman Catholic Church in the Archdiocese of Sydney adopted and
put forward as
the permanent corporate entity or interface between the
spiritual and temporal
sides of the Church.”
The Trustees were established as a body corporate pursuant to the Roman Catholic Church
Trust Property Act 1936. Any fair
reading of that Act reveals that the Trustees does little more than hold
property for the use of the Archdiocese.
Nothing in that Act, or in the description of their functions and powers,
suggests that they have any responsibility for the conduct of Church affairs or
management beyond the holding of property.
And in that sense, again, they are no different from many other
organisations (clerical and lay) that separate out entities that conduct
different functions. In NSW there is
legislation establishing church property trusts not only for the Catholic
Church, but also the Anglican Church, the Antiochan Orthodox Church, the Baptist
Churches, Christian Israelite Church, the Coptic Orthodox Church, the Greek
Orthodox Church, the Holy Apostolic Catholic Assyrian Church, the Presbyterian
Church, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Mormons, the Methodist Church of Samoa
in Australia, and the Uniting Church as well as for various individual Catholic
church orders (under the Roman Catholic
Church Communities’ Lands Act 1942).
There is nothing sinister about
establishing a trust to hold property.
It is a common feature of public and private life. And in any case where someone was injured as
a result of the condition of the land, for example, the Trustees would be an
appropriate entity to sue for that liability.
But where the liability arises from conduct that does not fall within
the bailiwick of the Trustees’ responsibility (such as, for example in Ellis’
case, pastoral care or the day-to-day management of the parish) then it is
difficult to see why the Trustees should be held liable. It would be like holding a local council
liable for abuse by a child care worker at a Day Care Centre operating on
council-owned land.
The difficulties confronting plaintiffs
such as Ellis is not that the valuable assets of the Church are held in a
property trust. One difficulty is that
the perpetrators are usually men of straw, so that they and their estates are
of little value. A further difficulty is
that there is no entity that could be regarded as a priest’s employer. But this difficulty is not solved merely by
requiring the Roman Catholic Church in NSW to incorporate (assuming it were
possible to do so). It would not
necessarily follow that the Church so-incorporated would automatically be
vicariously liable for the deliberate, criminal conduct of the Catholic
Clergy. The Church, so-incorporated, may
have no more control over the conduct of its clergy than it does over the
doctors who operate at St Vincent’s Public or Private Hospital. There might need to be a distinction drawn
between diocesan clergy and members of the Catholic orders, in which case
consideration would need to be given to the legal status of each individual
order. That there are enormous
difficulties in holding the Church vicariously liable for the conduct of its
clergy cannot be gainsaid. It is not
impossible, but while incorporating the Catholic Church removes the legal
entity hurdle, it does not remove the vicarious liability hurdle.
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