The High Court will deliver judgment in three cases this
week.
On Wednesday, 11 February 2015 the
Court will deliver judgment in Plaintiff S297/2013 v
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The Plaintiff is
a national of Pakistan who arrived in Australia by sea in May 2012 without a
visa, whereupon he was placed in detention. Initially prevented from
lodging a valid application for a protection visa by s46A(1) of the Migration
Act 1958 (Cth), he was later permitted to lodge such an application after a
determination by the Minister under s46A(2) of the Act. The Plaintiff’s
application however was refused by a delegate of the Minister in February 2013.
Upon a review of that refusal, the Refugee Review Tribunal remitted the
Plaintiff’s visa application to the Minister for reconsideration, having found
that the Plaintiff satisfied the visa criterion prescribed by s36(2)(a) of the
Act. On 4 March 2014 the Minister made a determination under s85 of the Act
that the maximum number of protection visas that could be granted in the
2013-2014 financial year was 2,773. When that figure came to be reached
(on 24 March 2014), the Plaintiff’s visa application still had not been
determined and the Plaintiff remained in immigration detention. On 20
June 2014, in Plaintiff S297/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border
Protection [2014] HCA 24 the High Court held the limit imposed on the
number of protection visas was invalid. A writ of mandamus was issued to the
Minister, commanding him to determine the Plaintiff’s application for a
protection visa according to law. On 17 July 2014 the Minister refused
the Plaintiff’s application, on the ground that he did not satisfy the
criterion imposed upon a grant of a protection visa in clause 866.226 of the
Regulations, which provides “[t]he Minister is satisfied that the grant of
the visa is in the national interest.” Although the Minister refused
to grant a protection visa, he immediately granted the Plaintiff a seven-day
safe haven visa and a three-year humanitarian visa (both under s 195A(2)
of the Act) and released him from detention. The Minister then filed a
notice certifying his compliance with the writ of mandamus. The Plaintiff now
challenges the sufficiency of the Minister’s compliance with the writ of mandamus.
The Plaintiff contends that clause 866.226 is invalid, on the basis that it is
inconsistent with ss501(3) and 501C of the Act. An alternative basis of
the alleged invalidity of clause 866.226 is that it departs from the scheme of
protection visas provided for by various provisions of the Act, including ss36
and 501.
The court will also deliver judgment in Lavin v Toppi,
an appeal from the NSW Court of Appeal Lavin and Toppi were directors and equal
shareholders of Luxe Studios Pty Ltd which had a loan from the National
Australia Bank. By written guarantee each of Lavin, Toppi and others associated
with them became guarantors of Luxe’s obligation to repay that loan. When
Luxe defaulted, the Bank sued the guarantors. Lavin reached an agreement with
the Bank, which was set out in a “Deed of Release and Settlement”. Under
the Deed, Lavin paid the Bank an amount that was less than half of the balance
owed to it by Luxe under the loan. The Bank in return covenanted not to
continue its claim against Lavin or to make a new claim against her. Its
claim against Lavin was then dismissed by consent. Toppi subsequently paid out
the rest of Luxe’s debt to the Bank. She then sued Lavin for an equitable
contribution to the difference between the amounts they had each paid to the
Bank. Lavin contended that the Deed had limited her liability as a co-surety
such that her liability to the Bank was no longer co-ordinate with
Toppi’s. At first instance Rein J ordered Lavin to pay Toppi equitable
compensation of $726,000, being half of the difference between the amount of
Lavin’s payment to the Bank and the amount paid by Toppi.. The NSW Court of
Appeal unanimously dismissed Lavin’s appeal, finding that none of the terms of
the Deed amounted to a release of Lavin from her liability to the Bank.
There was merely a promise not to sue, which in no way constrained the rights
of other guarantors as against Lavin. Toppi was therefore entitled to
equitable contribution from Lavin as a co‑surety.
The appeal raises a question of whether or not co-sureties are subject to co‑ordinate liabilities where one co-surety receives from the creditor a
covenant not to sue, and the proceedings brought by the creditor against that
co-surety are dismissed. It also raises a question of whether equitable
compensation is available where the co-surety derives no practical benefit from
the payment made to the creditor because, by reason of the covenant not to sue,
they could not be required to satisfy any remaining liability to the Bank.
Then
on Thursday, 12 February 2015 the Court will deliver judgment in Commissioner of
the Australian Federal Police v Zhao.
The respondents in this case are husband and wife. They husband has been
charged with various offences relating to dealing with cash taken from illegal
sex workers. The wife has not been charged with any offence. Orders were
made on the application of the AFP Commissioner to restrain the disposal of
properties and other personal items owned by the respondents under the Proceeds
of Crime Act 2002 (Cth). The AFP Commissioner then sought orders for
the forfeiture of the property. The respondents sought a stay of the
forfeiture proceedings ending the determination of the charges against the
husband. This was refused at first instance but granted on appeal.
At issue in the appeal is the effect of the earlier decision of the High Court
in Lee v The NSW Crime Commission (2013) 302 ALR 363 and in Lee v The
Queen (2014) 308 ALR 252 on the circumstances in which it is appropriate to
stay forfeiture proceedings pending determination of criminal charges.
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