Today the High Court delivered
judgment in Williams v Commonwealth,
in which the Williams challenged the National School Chaplaincy Program. In a 6-1 decision, the High Court upheld Williams’
challenge to the NSCP.
The NSCP is administered by the
Commonwealth Department of Education, through a series of funding agreements
concerning specific schools. The NSCP
Guidelines identify the organisations that are entitled to enter into funding
agreements for the purposes of the NSCP.
Participation in the NCSP by schools is voluntary, as is participation
by individual students if schools receive funding.
The “chaplaincy” services governed
by the NCSP include “general religious and personal advice to those seeking it,
and providing comfort and support to students and staff, such as during times
of grief” and “supporting students and staff to create an environment of
cooperation and respect, and promoting an understanding of diversity and the range
of religious affiliations and their traditions.” They are provided by person recognised as
being appropriately skilled to provide such services by a “religious
institution or a state/territory government approved chaplaincy service” and in
some circumstances secular pastoral care workers may be employed.
Upon its inception in 2007 the
NSCP made available funding of up to $30 million per annum for three years, to
be distributed to government and non-government schools in the form of grants
of up to $20,000 per annum, for the purpose of either establishing school
chaplaincy services, or enhancing existing services. In 2009 the NSCP was extended by the
Commonwealth to provide for an additional $42 million for the 2010 and 2011
school years.
On 9 November 2007 the
Commonwealth and Scripture Union Queensland entered into a Funding Agreement
for the provision by SUQ of chaplaincy services in accordance with the NSCP
Guidelines.
Williams is the father of students
at the Darling Heights State School in Queensland, a school that receives
chaplaincy services provided by SUQ. He
challenged the validity of the NCSP on the following main grounds (each of
which raises a number of subsidiary issues):
- Does the entry into the Funding Agreement exceed
the executive power of the Commonwealth, and in particular does the executive
power of the Commonwealth extend to entering into contracts in respect of
matters that go beyond the legislative power of the Commonwealth;
- Do the NCSP Guidelines impose a religious test
as a qualification for an office under the Commonwealth, and thereby contravene
section 116 of the Constitution?
Standing
An initial challenge was made by
the Commonwealth to the question of whether or not Williams had sufficient
standing to challenge the Funding Agreement, the drawing of money from
Consolidated Revenue, or the making of payments pursuant to the Funding
Agreement. It was held that Williams did have standing to challenge the Funding
Agreement, and the payments made pursuant to that agreement, and that is was
unnecessary to answer whether he had standing to challenge the drawing of money
from Consolidated Revenue.
Each of French CJ, Hayne, Crennan
and Kiefel JJ, purportedly agreed with the reasons of Gummow and Bell JJ for arriving at
these conclusions. However, Gummow and Bell JJ don’t actually give any reasons for doing
so. They simply assert that as the plaintiff’s
position was supported by the State interveners pursuant to their right of
intervention, “the questions of standing may be put to one side”.
Although in dissent more
generally, Heydon J agreed that Williams had standing to challenge the Funding
Agreement, and the payments made pursuant to the agreement. This was because Williams, as the father of
his children, had a “special interest” (if only as a matter of conscience) in
the activities within the school of the “chaplain”, who also participated in
conventional teaching activities, and which were being paid for pursuant to the
Funding Agreement.
Executive power of the Commonwealth
Although the central question in
the proceedings occupied a great deal of time in oral and written submissions,
and necessitated the consideration of a great deal of prior authority of the
Court, analysis of the scope of executive power at the time of Federation, and
a large body of academic literature, in the end the holding of the Court is a
relatively narrow one on the Executive Power of the Commonwealth conferred by
section 61, which reads: “The executive
power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the
Governor-General as the Queen’s representative, and extends to the execution
and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth.”
In its simplest terms, the Court
held that section 61 of the Constitution does not confer upon the Commonwealth
a power to enter into contracts except to the extent that such contracts are
expressly or impliedly authorised by the Constitution, or by legislation.
As French CJ was at pains to
emphasise, and Gummow and Bell JJ also indicated, that conclusion says nothing
about the availability of constitutional mechanisms, including conditional
grants to the States under section 96 of the Constitution and
inter-governmental agreements supported by legislation, which might enable such
services to be provided in accordance with the Constitution of the Commonwealth
and the Constitutions of the States. Nor
does it say anything about the power of the Commonwealth to enter into
contracts and expend moneys in the administration of departments of State
pursuant to section 64 of the Constitution, in the exercise of powers defined
by reference to such of the prerogatives of the Crown as are properly
attributable to the Commonwealth, or in the exercise of inherent authority
derived from the character and status of the Commonwealth as the national
government.
What was rejected was the
unqualified proposition that, subject to parliamentary appropriation, the
executive power of the Commonwealth extends generally to enable it to enter
into contracts and undertake expenditure of public moneys relating to any
subject matter falling within a head of Commonwealth legislative power.
The judgment of French CJ is
notable for its emphasis upon the federal nature of the Constitution. In several parts of the judgment emphasis was
placed upon the adverse consequences for federalism in accepting the broad
proposition that the Commonwealth, in common with any other legal person, has
the capacity at common law to enter into contracts (the limits to this being only
that its capacity to enter into and pay moneys pursuant to those contracts is
constrained by the need for an appropriation and by the requirements of
political accountability). Such a
general power would be inconsistent with the federal conception that informed
the function of the Senate as a necessary organ of Commonwealth legislative
power, and would undermine parliamentary control of the executive branch and
weaken the role of the Senate.
Gummow and Bell JJ also derived
support for their rejection of the Commonwealth’s unqualified proposition,
noting that its acceptance would:
undermine the basal assumption of
legislative predominance inherited from the United Kingdom and so would distort
the relationship between Ch I and Ch II of the Constitution. No doubt the
requirement of s 64 of the Constitution that Ministers of State be senators or
members of the House of Representatives has the consequence that the Minister
whose department administers an executive spending scheme, such as the NSCP, is
responsible to account for its administration to the Parliament. This is so
whether the responsibility is to the chamber of which the Minister is a member or
to the other chamber, in which the Minister is “represented” by another
Minister. But there remain considerations of representative as well as of
responsible government in cases where an executive spending scheme has no
legislative engagement for its creation or operation beyond the appropriation
process. And that appropriation process requires that the proposed law not
originate in the Senate, and that the proposed law appropriating revenue or
moneys “for the ordinary annual services of the Government” not be amended by
the Senate.
The necessity of Parliamentary
control over the expenditure of public moneys was also a feature of the
judgment of Hayne J in rejecting the broad submission that the Executives power
to spend money lawfully appropriated was unlimited, that control being
exercised not simply by its “power over appropriation” but also by “control
over the actual expenditure of the sums appropriated”.
However, Hayne J did not determine
the issue considered by French CJ and Gummow and Bell JJ as determinative. His Honour was content to determine the case
on the basis that the Commonwealth did not have the legislative power under
either the trading corporations power - s51(xx), or the student benefits power -
s51(xxiiiA) to authorize the entry into the Funding Agreement: “to conclude
that the Constitution requires that the Executive never spend money
lawfully available for expenditure without legislative authority to do so is to
decide a large and complex issue. It is better that it not be decided until it
is necessary to do so.
Crennan J also emphasised the
importance of parliamentary oversight of expenditure of money by the executive,
in terms generally consistent with the joint judgment of Gummow and Bell JJ.
Kiefel J, like Hayne J, declined
to resolve the question of whether and in what circumstances legislative or
Constitutional authority for the expenditure of moneys was required, and held
that the postulated bases of legislative authority advanced by the Commonwealth
would not have supported the provision of chaplaincy services by SUQ using
money provided by the Commonwealth.
Scope of the student benefits
power – section 51(xxiiiA)
One issue that arose (or
potentially arose) in the case was the question of whether or not there was
legislative power capable of supporting any Commonwealth legislation purporting
to authorise the entry into the Funding Agreement. It was unnecessary for French CJ or Crennan J
to consider that issue. Nor was it
necessary for Gummow and Bell JJ to consider that issue, although their honours
expressly left open the possibility that the entry into the Funding Agreement might be authorised by legislation
enacted pursuant to section 51(xxiiiA) (“benefits for students”) of the
Constitution. Hayne J and Kiefel J both
expressly held that any hypothetical law seeking to authorise the entry into
the Funding Agreement would not fall
within 51(xxiiiA). Heydon J held that
51(xxiiiA) would support legislation
authorising the provision of chaplaincy services by SUQ using money provided by
the Commonwealth.
Religion
In reasons with which the Court
generally agreed, Gummow and Bell JJ held that section 116 of the Constitution
(which states that “no religious test shall be required as a qualification for
any office or public trust under the Commonwealth”) had no relevance because,
even assuming that the definition of “school chaplain” imposed a “religious
test” for that office, the chaplains engaged by SUQ held no office under the
Commonwealth.
Heydon J agreed on the section 116
issue. In doubting that there was a
“religious test” at all his Honour noted that the definition of “school
chaplain” read together with the description of the services to be provided:
conveys the impression that, at
least at this school, neither the NSCP nor the qualification for “chaplains”
had much to do with religion in any specific or sectarian sense. The work
described could have been done by persons who met a religious test. It could
equally have been done by persons who did not.
Heydon J then colourfully noted:
In ordinary speech a “chaplain”
is the priest, clergyman or minister of a chapel; or a clergyman who conducts
religious services in the private chapel of an institution or household. Those
who are “school chaplains” under the NSCP’s auspices fall outside these
definitions. Their duties in schools are unconnected with any chapel. They
conduct no religious services. Perhaps those supporting validity committed an
error in calling the NSCP a “chaplaincy program” and speaking of “school
chaplains”. The language is inaccurate and may have been counterproductive.
Some vaguer expression, more pleasing to 21st century ears, like “mentor” or
“adviser” or “comforter” or “counsellor” or even “consultant”, might have had
an emollient effect. The plaintiff must have found the words “chaplain” and
“chaplaincy” useful for his contention that the NSCP was void under s 116.
In any event, they could not
properly be described as officers under the Commonwealth.
It cannot appoint, select,
approve or dismiss them. It cannot direct them. The services they provide in a
particular school are determined by those who run that school. The provision of
those services is overseen by school principals.
The Great Dissenter
Heydon J, in emphatic terms,
dissented in relation to the validity of the Funding Agreement.
His Honour noted that there was,
from an early stage, a “Common Assumption” made by the parties to the
proceedings that the executive power of the Commonwealth included a power to
enter into contracts without
statutory authority so long as the Commonwealth had the legislative power to give it statutory authority. According
to Heydon J this Common Assumption was present in Williams’ written
submissions, repeated in the Outline of Oral Submissions, was accepted as
correct by the written submissions of the other parties and interveners, and
was described by the State of Queensland as “the orthodox test of the scope of
executive power.”
The Common Assumption broke down
when Western Australia began its address, and withdrew the acceptance of the
Common Assumption from its written submissions, and Williams and most of the
interveners followed suit and lined up against the Commonwealth. As a result of this renversement des alliances, in the colourful words of Matthew
Arnold, “the Court was as on a darkling plain, swept with confused alarms of
struggle and flight, where ignorant armies clash by night”.
Heydon J devoted some considerable
verbage to the consequences of the Common Assumption and its breakdown. His
Honour noted:
The five parties and the seven
interveners were represented by exceptionally capable and experienced
constitutional lawyers. Those lawyers included seven Solicitors-General and a
retired Federal Court judge. Their solemn adherence to the Common Assumption,
during the calm and leisured composition of their written submissions, is a
significant phenomenon. If Hugh Cairns and Roundell Palmer, arguing opposite
sides of a case, agreed on a principle of equity, that was some indication that
that principle was sound. Of course, an agreement between parties or
interveners on the law does not bind the courts. Adherence to the Common
Assumption does not demonstrate or constitute the law. It is not decisive. But
it is material. Why did this large group of expert constitutional lawyers
initially adhere to the Common Assumption? Because they thought it to be
correct. And it was correct.
Having discussed the authorities
of the Court, which were said to support the Common Assumption, Heydon J asked
whether the Common Assumption was so wrong as a matter of principle as distinct
from authority that it should be overruled? To this Heydon J responded with an
astonishing spray:
This case is not an appropriate
one in which that question should be answered. All parties and interveners
initially adhered to the Common Assumption. Its sudden abandonment by the
plaintiff and most government interveners during oral argument meant that the
submissions attacking and defending the Common Assumption were deployed only at
a very late stage of the fray. Inevitably, they betrayed signs of
disorganisation. It is true that the plaintiff, South Australia, Tasmania and the
Commonwealth were given leave to file additional written submissions after the
oral argument closed. But this gave the Commonwealth only the period between
when oral argument ended on 11 August 2011, and when the additional submissions
were filed on 1 September 2011, to consider the point. On 7 August 2011, urgent
and important litigation affecting the Commonwealth had commenced [A reference
to M70 v Commonwealth, the “Malaysia
Solution” Case]. Interlocutory hearings took place. After 11 August 2011, written
argument was filed and preparation for oral argument took place. Oral argument
was then heard on 22 and 23 August 2011. That litigation was decided on 31
August 2011. This must have depleted the relevant resources of Commonwealth
energy and distracted those who were to tap them. It is important that points of fundamental significance such as
the one that this case belatedly raised be pondered by counsel for years – as
they often are when appeals come to this Court – or at least for months – as is
usual when matters in the original jurisdiction are brought to the Full Court.
Above all, they need to be considered calmly. Radical changes in the
construction of the Constitution should not be made without better assistance
than the unpredicted conspiracy of circumstances permitted counsel to provide
in this case.
Conclusion
It is difficult to know what the future of the NCSP is as a result of this judgment. There must be some doubt as to whether the Commonwealth could validly legislate to resurrect it. However, even assuming no legislative power to authorise to authorise the entry into the Funding Agreements, other constitutional mechanisms would seem to be available to enable the program to continue (most obviously, the provisions of tied grants under section 96).
More broadly, there is at least a majority of French CJ, Gummow, Bell and Crennan JJ who are of the view that the executive power of the Commonwealth is constrained not only by it's power to legislate but also by the fact of legislation authorising the entry into contracts pursuant to which it seeks to pay moneys in fulfilment of its programs. In a practical sense, this ultimately may not amount to very much, as similar ends will be achieved by legislatively providing the express authority to enter into such contracts, or achieving the same results via tied grants to the States.
However, more significantly the High Court has continued in its preparedness to challenge long-held assumptions about Commonwealth expenditure powers, and it can be expected that before too long the scope of various other powers of the Commonwealth to expend moneys (most notably sections 64 and 96 of the Constitution) will come under renewed challenge.